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        <title><![CDATA[employment discrimination - Famighetti & Weinick]]></title>
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                <title><![CDATA[Punitive Damages Under New York City Human Rights Law]]></title>
                <link>https://www.linycemploymentlaw.com/blog/punitive-damages-under-new-york-city-human-rights-law/</link>
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                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Famighetti & Weinick]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Tue, 21 Nov 2017 15:55:57 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[blog]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Employment Discrimination]]></category>
                
                
                    <category><![CDATA[employment discrimination]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[long island employment lawyers]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[new york city human rights law]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[punitive damages]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[sex discrimination]]></category>
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>The New York City Human Rights Law prohibits employment discrimination based on, among other things, an employee’s gender. The law has plainly provided for punitive damages against employers who violate the law. Punitive damages are generally available in cases as a way to dissuade others from engaging in similar unlawful conduct and to punish the&hellip;</p>
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<p>The New York City Human Rights Law prohibits employment discrimination based on, among other things, an employee’s gender.  The law has plainly provided for punitive damages against employers who violate the law.  Punitive damages are generally available in cases as a way to dissuade others from engaging in similar unlawful conduct and to punish the wrongdoer.  On November 20, 2017, the Court of Appeals, New York’s highest state court, settled the standard which courts should apply in deciding whether punitive damages should be allowed in a discrimination case.
</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-employment-discrimination-lawsuit-in-federal-court">Employment Discrimination Lawsuit in Federal Court</h2>



<p>
In Chauca v. Abraham, the employee was a physical therapy aide.  She sued her employer for sex and pregnancy discrimination, under the federal law Title VII, under the New York State Human Rights Law, and under the New York City Human Rights Law.  At trial, the employee’s lawyer asked the judge to instruct the jury to consider whether punitive damages were appropriate under the New York City Human Rights Law.  The court applied Title VII’s punitive damages standard which requires the employee to show malice, reckless indifference, or an intent to violate the law.  The court determined that the employee did not show any evidence of intent so the judge refused to instruct the jury to consider imposing punitive damages.</p>



<p>The employee appealed the court’s decision to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, New York’s federal appellate court.  The Second Circuit had previously held that Title VII’s standard applies to the New York City Human Rights law, but in Chauca, the court questioned whether that decision was correct in light of subsequent amendments to the New York City Human Rights Law which instructs courts to liberally construe the law.  As the issue invoked questions of state law, the Second Circuit certified the question to the New York Court of Appeals.  In other words, the federal court asked the state court to interpret the the city law.
</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-new-york-court-of-appeals-decides-punitive-damages-standard">New York Court of Appeals Decides Punitive Damages Standard</h2>



<p>
The New York Court of Appeals looked at the language of the Human Rights Law.  It determined that the statute provides for compensatory and punitive damages.  It further determined that an employer can mitigate punitive damages by proving it maintains policies to deter discrimination. The court, however, did not find that the law provided a standard for when punitive damages should be assessed against the employer.</p>



<p>The employee argued that the legislative intent of the Human Rights Law requires that punitive damages should be available to any employee who proves discrimination.  The court disagreed and held that punitive damages are available only when “aggravating factors demonstrate an additional level of wrongful conduct.”</p>



<p>The court, however, also rejected the employer’s argument that Title VII’s standard was appropriate.  The court noted that the New York City council adopted amendments to the City Human Rights Law to ensure it would be liberally construed in favor of plaintiffs.  The court relied on the state’s common law standard for punitive damages.  In sum, the court determined that punitive damages are available for employees who can show the employer “has engaged in discrimination with wilful or wanton negligence, or recklessness, or ‘a conscious disregard of the rights of others or conduct so reckless as to amount to such a disregard.'”</p>



<p>Notably, one judge dissented in the decision.  The judge noted that the common law standard was not included anywhere in the Human Rights Law and so it was error to apply that standard instead of the most plaintiff-friendly standard available.
</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-long-island-employment-lawyers">Long Island Employment Lawyers</h2>



<p>
If you have questions about punitive damages or employment discrimination under the New York City Human Rights Law, the New York State Human Rights, or Title VII, contact a Long Island employment lawyer at Famighetti & Weinick, PLLC at 631-352-0050. Our website is https://www.linycemploymentlaw.com.</p>


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<figure class="alignleft is-resized"><img decoding="async" src="/static/2017/11/Punitive-damages.jpg" alt="Punitive damages in employment discrimination cases" style="width:240px;height:159px"/><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Punitive damages in employment discrimination cases</figcaption></figure></div>]]></content:encoded>
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                <title><![CDATA[Discrimination by Religious Employers]]></title>
                <link>https://www.linycemploymentlaw.com/blog/discrimination-by-religious-employers/</link>
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                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Famighetti & Weinick]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Mon, 17 Jul 2017 16:29:06 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[blog]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Employment Discrimination]]></category>
                
                
                    <category><![CDATA[employment discrimination]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[employment lawyers long island]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[employment retaliation]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[ministerial exception]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[retaliation lawyers long island]]></category>
                
                
                
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                <description><![CDATA[<p>Employers are prohibited from discriminating against its employees based, among other things, on race, gender, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or familial status. Employers are also prohibited from retaliating against its employees. This means that an employer cannot punish an employee for engaging in legally protected activity. For example, if an employee complains&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>Employers are prohibited from discriminating against its employees based, among other things, on race, gender, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or familial status. Employers are also prohibited from retaliating against its employees. This means that an employer cannot punish an employee for engaging in legally protected activity. For example, if an employee complains either to a supervisor or to an outside agency (such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) about workplace discrimination and the employee subsequently suffers a negative employment action as a result of making the complaint, the employer has unlawfully retaliated against its employee.</p>



<p>However, the law is filled with exceptions. One of the exceptions to employment discrimination and retaliation is called the “ministerial exception.” This exception was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in 2012 in the Hosanna-Tabor case where the Court found that a fourth grade teacher, who taught mainly non-religious subjects at a religious school, could not sue her employer for retaliation.
</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-the-ministerial-exception-in-employment-discrimination-cases">The Ministerial Exception in Employment Discrimination Cases</h2>



<p>
The main reason for the ministerial exception is not to make it more difficult for employees, but rather to not infringe on an employer’s First Amendment rights. In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court explained that requiring a church or a religious group to accept or retain an unwanted minister, would violate the First Amendment which prohibits the government from intruding in such decisions.</p>



<p>On July 14, 2017, the Second Circuit addressed the scope of the ministerial exception for the first time in Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York.</p>



<p>In the Fratello case, Fratello was a principal at St. Anthony’s School in Nanuet, New York located in Rockland County. In 2011, the school did not renew her contract. Although it was not mentioned in detail in the court’s decision, the school terminated Fratello because of insubordination towards the pastor of St. Anthony’s. However, Fratello alleged that she was terminated based on gender discrimination and in retaliation for reporting the alleged discrimination.</p>



<p>Although the court determined that Fratello qualified as a “minister” under the law, Fratello did not have any formal training in religious studies or theology. In fact, all of her academic credentials were in education. However, her role as a principal at St. Anthony’s involved being the school’s catholic leader. As such, she implemented a new prayer system at the school where every morning a student would pray over the loudspeaker system. She also communicated religious messages over the loudspeaker such as reciting the “Our Father” and the ten “Hail Mary” prayers.</p>



<p>To determine whether Fratello qualified as a “minister” under the law thus falling under the ministerial exception, the Second Circuit used four factors established by the Supreme Court in the Hosanna-Tabor case. These factors included: (1) the employee’s formal title, (2) the substance reflected in that title, (3) the use of that title, and, (4) the religious functions performed. However, the Court made it clear that these factors did not create a bright line test.</p>



<p>When applying the factors above in the Fratello case, the court determined that the first factor was the only one that weighed against applying the ministerial exception because Fratello’s formal title was “lay principal.” However, the court ultimately found that the remaining three factors weighed in favor of applying the exception because Fratello was not only St. Anthony’s spiritual leader, but she “performed many important religious functions to advance its Roman Catholic mission.”</p>



<p>In sum, although the court did not allow Fratello to sue the school for employment discrimination and retaliation, not every religious leader may fall under the ministerial exception.
</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-long-island-employment-lawyers-can-help-fight-employment-discrimination">Long Island Employment Lawyers Can Help Fight Employment Discrimination</h2>



<p>
If you have questions about the ministerial exception or employment discrimination and retaliation, contact the Long Island employment lawyers at Famighetti & Weinick, PLLC. Our phone number is 631-352-0050 and our website is http://linycemployment.com.</p>



<p>Today’s employment law blog was written law student intern, Thalia Olaya.</p>
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